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Abstract
Unconditional security proofs of various quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are built
on idealized assumptions. One key assumption is: the sender (Alice) can prepare the required
quantum states without errors. However, such an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD
system. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a technically feasible “intercept-and-resend”
attack that exploits such a security loophole in a commercial “plug & play” QKD system. The
resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is below the proven secure bound of 20.0% for the
BB84 protocol. The attack we utilize is the phase-remapping attack (C.-H. F. Fung, et al., Phys.
Rev. A, 75, 32314, 2007) proposed by our group.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] enables an ultimately secure means of distributing
secret keys between two parties, the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob). In principle, any
eavesdropping attempt by a third party (Eve) will unavoidably introduce disturbance and
be detected. The unconditional security of the BB84 QKD protocol has been rigorously
proved based on the laws of quantum mechanics [4], even when implemented on imperfect
practical setups [5].
Unfortunately, a practical QKD system has imperfections. Eve may try to exploit these
imperfections and launch specific attacks not covered by the original security proofs. Is it
possible that a small unnoticed imperfection spoils the security of the otherwise carefully
designed QKD system? This question has drawn a lot of attention. Gisin et al. studied
a Trojan-horse attack employing the unwanted internal reflection from a phase modulator
[6]. Makarov et al. proposed a faked state attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of
two detectors in a practical QKD system [7]. Our group has proposed [8] a simple attack—
time-shift attack—that exploits the same imperfection. Moreover, we have experimentally
demonstrated [9] our attack against a commercial QKD system. This was the first time that
a commercial QKD system had been successfully hacked, thus highlighting the vulnerability
of even well-designed commercial QKD systems. Lamas-Linares et al. demonstrated that
the information leakage due to public announcement of the timing information can be used
by Eve to access part of the sifted keys [10]. Recently, the imperfections of some particular
single photon detectors, namely those based on passively or actively quenched avalanche
photodiodes, and potential security loopholes of practical QKD systems employing such
detectors have been studied in [11]. For more general discussions, see [12].
A key assumption in QKD is Alice encodes her signals correctly. This seems like a simple
assumption. However, it may be violated in practice by, for example the phase-remapping
attack [13]. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the phase-remapping attack in
a commercial QKD system. In contrast with the time-shift attack, the phase-remapping
attack is an “intercept-and-resend” attack which allows Eve to gain the full information of
the sifted keys. Here, we experimentally find that the phase remapping process in a practical
QKD system is much more complicated than the theoretical model in Ref. [13]. To adapt
to this complexity, we have modified the original phase-remapping attack into type 1 and
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type 2 practical attacks, where type 2 attack is more practical in QKD systems. It is well
known that in the standard BB84 QKD system, a simple “intercept-and-resend” attack
will introduce a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 25% which alarms the users that no
secure keys can be generated. Our experimental results show that by performing the phase-
remapping attack, Eve can gain the full information at the cost of introducing a QBER of
19.7%, which is lower than the proven security bound of 20.0% for the BB84 protocol [14].
In other words, the security of the commercial QKD system is compromised.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we summarize the basic idea of phase-
remapping attack and then propose our theoretical model to analyze QBER. In Section III,
we describe the phase modulation scheme adopted in a commercial “plug and play” QKD
system and discuss two types of practical attacks which could be applied to this specific
design. In Section IV, we show the experimental results and analyze the QBER. We finally
conclude our paper with some general comments in Section V.
II. PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK
Practical limitations associated with phase and polarization instabilities over long dis-
tance fibers have led to the development of bidirectional QKD schemes, such as the “plug-
and-play” QKD structure [15] and the Sagnac QKD structure [16]. Specially, the “plug-
and-play” structure is widely used in commercial QKD systems [17]. In this system, Bob
first sends two strong laser pulses (signal pulse and reference pulse) to Alice. Alice uses
the reference pulse as a synchronization signal to activate her phase modulator. Then Alice
modulates the phase of the signal pulse only, attenuates the two pulses to single photon level,
and sends them back to Bob. Bob randomly chooses his measurement basis by modulating
the phase of the returning reference pulse. Since Alice allows signals to go in and go out
of her device, this opens a potential back door for Eve to launch various attacks [6]. One
specific attack is the phase-remapping attack [13].
LiNbO3 waveguide phase modulator is commonly used to encode random bits in fiber
based phase-coding BB84 QKD system. In practice, a phase modulator has finite response
time, as shown in Fig. 1. Ideally, Bob’s signal pulse passes through Alice’s phase modulator
in the middle of the modulation signal and undergoes a proper modulation (time t0 in Fig.
1). However, if Eve changes the time difference between the reference and the signal pulse,
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FIG. 1: Diagram of phase modulation (PM) signal. t0 is the original time location where Bob’s
signal pulse is properly modulated to have phase φ0. Eve time shifts the signal pulse from t0 to t1.
This pulse will undergo a new modulated phase φ1.
the signal pulse will pass through the phase modulator at a different time (time t1 in Fig. 1),
and the encoded phase will be different. Originally, Alice uses {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to encode
{01(bit “0” in base1), 02(bit “0” in base2), 11(bit “1” in base1), 12(bit “1” in base2)}. Now,
after Eve’s remapping process, Alice’s encoded phases {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} will be mapped
to {0, φ1, φ1 + φ2, φ1 + φ2 + φ3}, where φi (i=1,2,3) is the new phase difference between
two adjacent states. Ref [13] assumed for simplicity, that the phase modulator has the same
rising time and proportional phase modulation for each encoded phase, i.e. φ1=φ2=φ3. Here,
we consider a more general setting. The exact value of φi depends on time displacement
introduced by Eve and the actual phase modulation system. This phase remapping process
allows Eve to launch a novel “intercept-and-resend” attack: phase-remapping attack. In our
experiment, the practical attack strategy is:
(1) Eve intercepts Bob’s strong pulse and sends a time-shifted pulse to Alice via her own
device. Note that Eve can change the actual values of φi(i=1,2,3) by changing the time
displacement. However, she cannot change φ1, φ2, and φ3 independently.
(2) Eve’s strategy is to either distinguish {01} from {02, 11, 12} or {12} from {01, 02, 11}
with minimal errors. To distinguish {01}, Eve introduces a phase shift of {φ1+φ2} by using
her phase modulator on the reference pulse sent back by Alice and performs an interference
measurement. If detector1 has a click [18], Eve sends a standard BB84 state {01} to Bob.
Otherwise, Eve simply discards it. A similar procedure is performed to distinguish {12},
where Eve introduces a phase shift of {φ1} on the reference pulse. Here, we define Eve’s
phase shift {φ1} as Base1, {φ1 + φ2} as Base2.
Now, assume that Eve uses Base2 to distinguish {01}; given Alice sends different states
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{01, 02, 11, 12}, Det1’s detecting probabilities {P01 , P02 , P11 , P12} are {sin
2(φ1+φ2
2
), sin2(φ2
2
),
0, sin2(φ3
2
)}. After Eve’s attack, the error probabilities introduced are {0, 1/2, 1, 1/2}. The
analysis in Base1 can be carried out similarly. So the QBERs are
Base2 : QBER2 =
sin2(
φ2
2
)
2
+
sin2(
φ3
2
)
2
sin2(φ1+φ2
2
) + sin2(φ2
2
) + sin2(φ3
2
)
Base1 : QBER1 =
sin2(
φ1
2
)
2
+
sin2(
φ2
2
)
2
sin2(φ2+φ3
2
) + sin2(φ2
2
) + sin2(φ1
2
)
(1)
Ref [13] assumed φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = φ, then the total QBER is given by
QBER =
QBER1 +QBER2
2
=
sin2(φ
2
)
sin2(φ) + 2 sin2(φ
2
)
(2)
As shown in Fig. 2, there is a range of “φ” that allows QBER to go below 20.0%, which
is tolerable in the BB84 protocol [14]. So, if Eve remaps the phase small enough into this
range, she can successfully apply this “intercept-and-resend” attack.
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FIG. 2: (Color online). QBER of phase-remapping attack. Eve remaps the four BB84 states with
the same new phase difference (φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = φ).
III. EXPERIMENTAL PHASE-REMAPPING ATTACK IN A COMMERCIAL
“PLUG & PLAY ” QKD SYSTEM
We implemented the phase remapping attack in a commercial ID-500 QKD system (manu-
factured by id Quantique), as shown in Fig. 3. Bob’s signal pulse, reference pulse and Alice’s
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Experimental implementation of the phase-remapping attack in a com-
mercial ID-500 QKD system. Original QKD system: LD, laser diode. Det1/Det2, single photon
detector; PMA/B, phase modulator; C, circulator. PBS, polarization beam splitter; CD, classical
photodetector; DL, delay line; FM, Faraday mirror. Our modifications: Eve replaces Bob; VODL,
variable optical delay line; PC, polarization controller.
FIG. 4: (Color online). Time patterns of the reference pulse (Ref), the signal pulse (Sig) and the
phase modulation signal in the commercial ID-500 QKD setup. Here, Alice’s encoding phase is
{pi} and we only show the forward pulses.
phase modulation signal of the original QKD system are shown in Fig. 4. Note that in Fig.
4, since Alice uses the reference pulse as a trigger signal, the time delay ∆t1 is determined
by the internal delay of Alice’s system and can’t be controlled by Eve. On the other hand,
since Alice doesn’t monitor the arrival time of the signal pulse, Eve can change the time
delay ∆t3 without being detected. Furthermore, the rising edge of the phase modulation
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signal is around 8ns, while the width of the laser pulse is about 500ps. Eve can easily place
her pulse on the rising edge to get partial phase modulation. This specific QKD design
opens a security loophole which allows Eve to launch the phase-remapping attack.
In our experiment, Eve utilized the same setup as Bob to launch her attack. Eve modified
the length of the short arm of her Mach-Zehnder interferometer by adding a variable optical
delay line (VODL in Fig. 3) to shift the time delay between the reference pulse and the
signal pulse. To remap the phase small enough into the low QBER range, the optimal
strategy we found is: by using VODL, Eve shifts the forward signal pulse out and only the
backward signal pulse in the phase modulation range (see Fig. 5(b)).
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FIG. 5: Time pattern of practical phase-remapping attack. Sig: signal pulse. Ref: reference pulse.
PM: phase modulation signal. (a) Normal QKD operation. (b) Type 1 practical phase-remapping
attack. (c) Type 2 practical phase-remapping attack; here, even if we assume Alice has a perfect
phase modulator with strictly sharp rising and following edge, Type 2 attack still works.
One important practical challenge in our experiment is polarization control. The phase
modulator in Alice’s system is polarization dependent and has one principle axis. Photons
with polarization aligned with the principle axis will undergo a large phase modulation, while
photons with orthogonal polarization state will undergo a small phase modulation [19]. In
our experiment, we find the relative modulation magnitude ratio of the two polarizations is
about 1 : 3 [20]. In the original “plug and play” system, the signal pulse will be modulated
twice as it passes through Alice’s phase modulator back and forth (see Fig. 5(a)). Because of
the Faraday mirror, the total phase shift is independent of the polarization state of the signal
pulse. However, since Eve’s signal pulse will pass through the modulator at a different time
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and be modulated only once (see Fig. 5(b)), the above auto-compensating method will not
work. Eve has to control the polarization direction either aligned with or orthogonal to the
principal axis of the phase modulator when her signal pulse is modulated. This is achieved
by adding a polarization controller (PC in Fig. 3) in Eve’s system and adjusting it carefully.
Here, Eve can assume that the polarization has been aligned properly by maximizing the
total counts of D1+D2 (D1 and D2 denote the counts of Det1 and Det2) [21].
By combining variable shifting time and two different polarization directions, Eve can
apply two types of practical phase-remapping attack:
1. Type 1 practical attack is shown in Fig. 5(b). Eve shifts the forward signal pulse
out of the phase modulation signal and the backward pulse to the rising edge, and
adjusts the PC to control the backward pulse’s polarization direction aligned with
the modulator’s principal axis. Here, we remark that if the width of laser pulse is
comparable with the rising time of the modulation signal, the type 1 attack will cause
an unreasonably high QBER, thus it is easy for Alice and Bob to detect the attack.
2. Type 2 practical attack is shown in Fig. 5(c). Eve shifts the backward pulse to the
plateau region of the phase modulation signal, and aligns its polarization direction
orthogonal to the principal axis. Since the orthogonal direction has the smallest phase
modulation, Eve can successfully remap the phase small enough into the low QBER
range. One important advantage of type 2 attack is: even if Alice’s phase modulator
is good enough with strictly sharp rising and following edge (force type 1 attack
noneffective), Eve can still apply type 2 attack in practical QKD systems.
Another challenge is the optimization of VODL. Ref [13] assumed Eve could remap Alice’s
encoded phase with φ1 = φ2 = φ3. However, in our experiment, the relation among φ1, φ2,
and φ3 is more complicated. As shown in Fig. 6, Alice’s phase modulation signals {pi/2, pi,
3pi/2} not only start at different times but also have different average rising times {6.12ns,
7.82ns, 9.47ns}. Furthermore, there is also an overshoot after the rising edge, and the time is
different from each other. So, if we use different lengths of VODL to shift the pulse either to
the rising edge or to the overshooting range, the pulse will not undergo proportional phase
modulation. Eve’s remapping phase will be φ1 6= φ2 6= φ3. These complicated phases will
thus cause an effect of QBER as shown in Eqn. (1).
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FIG. 6: (Color online). (a)Alice’s phase modulation signals, pi/2, pi, and 3pi/2, respectively. (b)
The zoomed rising edge of each modulation signal and the approximate time of the optimal VODL
used in our attack.
In our experiment, the optimal length of VODL was determined by minimizing the re-
sulting QBER. We finally applied two optimal VODL (see Fig. 6(b)) to launch two types of
practical phase remapping attack: VODL A: 4.65m and VODL B: 5.8m. Our attack strategy
was the one discussed in Section II. Here, we remark two points: (1) from the time pattern
graph in Fig. 4, the laser pulse is narrow enough to allow us to apply type 1 attack; (2) in
type 1 attack, to make the remapping phase small enough, we still control the polarization
of backward pulse orthogonal to the principal axis.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Y0 edet ηBob µ
2.11× 10−5 0.38 × 10−2 5.82 × 10−2 1.39
TABLE I: Experimental parameters.
Some experimental parameters of our ID-500 commercial QKD system, including dark
count rate Y0, detector error rate edet, Bob’s overall quantum efficiency ηBob (including
the detection efficiency of single photon detector), detection efficiency η and mean photon
number µ are listed in Table I. Our transmission distance was a few meters. We repeated
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the measurement 10 million times for each state sent by Alice and the experimental results
are shown in Table II.
Base0 Base1 Base2
State φA φE D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2
01 0
◦ 0◦ 617 168910 7068 174061 24841 156007
02 90
◦ 21.1◦ 5843 167206 1074 179218 8557 170786
11 180
◦ 37.8◦ 18096 153962 5285 174161 1239 176091
12 270
◦ 52.7◦ 33260 135616 19770 160300 3530 173428
(a)
Base0 Base1 Base2
State φA φE D1 D2 D1 D2 D1 D2
01 0
◦ 0◦ 734 171851 6617 166671 16311 158479
02 90
◦ 23.9◦ 7435 165402 928 169814 2772 169669
11 180
◦ 35.9◦ 16474 157385 3545 166427 1348 168924
12 270
◦ 46.3◦ 26879 146917 8434 161575 2672 168078
(b)
TABLE II: Experiment results. φA is Alice’s original standard BB84 phase. φE is the new phase
remapped by Eve. D1 (D2) is the counts number of Det1 (Det2). Here, Eve introduced phase {0}
(Base0), {φ1} (Base1), and {φ1 + φ2} (Base2), respectively on the reference pulse to measure each
state, and repeated the measurement 10 million times for each state. (a) Variable Optical Delay
Line A (4.65m). (b) Variable Optical Delay Line B (5.8m).
QBER is analyzed as follows. First, we calculate QBER from the theoretical model
discussed in Section II. The detecting probability of phase-coding BB84 QKD protocol is
Det1 : P1 =
1− cos(φA − φB)
2
= sin2(
φA − φB
2
) =
D1−NY0
D1 +D2− 2NY0
Det2 : P2 =
1 + cos(φA − φB)
2
= cos2(
φA − φB
2
) =
D2−NY0
D1 +D2− 2NY0
(3)
where N denotes the gating number [22]. Here, we subtract the dark counts number NY0
from each detector’s counts number to get the theoretical detecting probability.
If Eve introduces phase shift {0} (Base0) on the reference pulse to measure each state,
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the remapping phase φE and phase difference φi (i=1,2,3) are
φE = 2 tan
−1(
√
D1−NY0
D2−NY0
)
φi = φE(i) − φE(i−1)
(4)
Using data in Table II, from Eqn. (4) and (1), we can get
V ODL A : φ1 = 21.1
◦ ± 1.1◦ φ2 = 16.7
◦ ± 1.1◦ φ3 = 14.9
◦ ± 1.1◦
QBER1(A) = 21% QBER2(A) = 13%
V ODL B : φ1 = 23.9
◦ ± 1.2◦ φ2 = 12
◦ ± 1.2◦ φ3 = 10.4
◦ ± 1.2◦
QBER1(B) = 29% QBER2(B) = 8%
(5)
The phase error fluctuations are mainly due to the imperfections of our experimental
QKD system. From the results in Table II, we can see that even though Eve uses Base0 to
measure state {01}, it still has about “600 ∼ 700” counts on Det1. These error counts are
mostly from the imperfect interference between the signal pulse and the reference pulse. So,
Eqn. (5) gives the theoretical QBERs introduced by Eve with perfect detection system.
Now, we calculate QBER via our direct experimental results. From Table II, we can see
the total counts (D1+D2) are almost identical, so Det1’s detecting probability for each state
is proportional to D1. The QBERs can be calculated using data in Table II:
Base1 : QBER1 =
D101
2
+
D111
2
+D102
D101 +D102 +D111 +D112
Base2 : QBER2 =
D102
2
+
D112
2
+D111
D101 +D102 +D111 +D112
(6)
V OL A : QBER1(A) = 21.8% QBER2(A) = 19.1%
V OL B : QBER1(B) = 30.8% QBER2(B) = 17.6%
(7)
It is surprising to see that if Eve utilizes the optimal strategy to combine two types
of attack together and carefully chooses the the probability of each attack to ensure the
distribution of bit “0” and bit “1” received by Bob is balanced, the overall QBER will be
QBER =
QBER1(A) +QBER2(B)
2
= 19.7% (8)
Note that we used weak coherent pulse (WCP) source in our experiment. Before calcu-
lating the QBERs for single-photon (SP) source, we emphasize two facts: (1) the phase shift
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introduced by the phase modulator is independent of the source. If the source is a SP, the
phase will be also remapped to {0, φ1, φ1+φ2, φ1+φ2+φ3}. (2) Eve’s interference visibility
is the same for SP and WCP. Now, assume that Eve introduces Base1 to launch attack and
Det1’s detecting probability for each state is Pstate, i.e. {P01 , P02 , P11 , P12}, Det1’s overall
gain and QBERs for the two different sources are given by:
SP : Qsp = ηBobPstate + Y0
QBERsp =
ηBob(
P01
2
+
P11
2
+ P02) + 2Y0
ηBob(P01 + P02 + P11 + P12) + 4Y0
(9)
WCP : Qwcp =
∞∑
i=0
(Y0 + 1− (1− ηBobPstate)
i)
µi
i!
e−µ = (1− e−µηBobPstate) + Y0
QBERwcp =
2− e
−µηBobP01
2
− e
−µηBobP11
2
− e−µηBobP02 + 2Y0
4− e−µηBobP01 − e−µηBobP02 − e−µηBobP11 − e−µηBobP12 + 4Y0
(10)
Using Eqn. (9-10) and data in Table I and II, the overall QBER difference between SP
and WCP for Eve’s optimal strategy (combine two types of attack as Eqn. (8)) is:
∆QBER = QBERsp −QBERwcp = 0.1% (11)
Therefore, in a practical SP BB84 QKD system, we can expect the QBER is
QBERsp=19.8%, which is lower than the tolerate security bound of 20.0% [14]. The secu-
rity of SP BB84 QKD system is compromised. Eve can also combine the phase-remapping
attack with a faked state attack together to substantially enhance its power [13]. Finally,
we remark that even if we have only broken a practical SP BB84 QKD system, the security
proofs of both WCP and SP QKD are based on the same assumptions. One key assumption
(Alice prepares her states correctly) has been violated in our experimental demonstration.
So the security proofs can not be directly applied to a practical QKD system.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude this paper with some general comments. First, let us consider countermea-
sures. In the “plug-and-play” QKD system, one specific countermeasure is the following:
Alice carefully checks the arrival time of the reference pulse and the signal pulse by mon-
itoring with her classical detector (CD in Fig. 3). From the time delay between the two
pulses, she can find whether the time difference has been shifted by Eve, and thus counter
12
Eve’s attack. Moreover, in our attack, Eve only sends two states to Bob. Alice and Bob
can detect this attack by estimating the statistics of the four BB84 states. Note that, once
a security loophole has been found, it is often easy to develop countermeasures. However,
the unanticipated attacks are the most fatal ones.
Second, this paper mainly focuses on one key assumption in unconditional security proofs,
i.e. Alice prepares the required states correctly. From a simple experimental demonstration,
we show this assumption can be violated by our attack. So, we emphasize that, in a practical
QKD system, Alice needs to experimentally verify she is applying the correct modulations
on her states. One possible way in a general QKD system is: after encoding her random
bits, Alice uses a beam splitter to split part of each strong modulated signal, and then
use a classical detector, such as a power meter (rather than a single-photon detector), to
implement a local measurement to directly verify whether she has performed the correct
modulation. In order to achieve unconditional security with a practical QKD system, it is
useful to perform such a verification experimentally. In the long term, it is important to
work towards QKD with testable assumptions.
Third, Eve can also maximize her ability to eavesdrop by combining various attacks.
For instance, she may combine the phase-remapping attack with the time-shift attack to
exploit both the imperfections of Alice’s encoding system and Bob’s detection system. If
she does so, the QBER might be reduced further. We remark that, it is impossible to
remove all imperfections completely in practice. Instead of removing them, what we can do
is to quantify them carefully. Once quantified, those imperfections may be taken care of in
security proofs [5, 23]. As an example, mismatch in detection efficiency has been taken into
account in the security proof of [24].
Finally, our demonstration of the phase remapping attack was done on a specific im-
plementation of QKD. Notice, however that the implementation is the one widely used in
commercial QKD systems [17]. Moreover, in a general class of QKD systems and protocols,
our work highlights the significance for Alice to verify the correctness of her preparation.
In practice, any QKD is done on a specific implementation and it has imperfections. If we
can’t trust a specific implementation of QKD, one should never use QKD in the first place.
In summary, we have experimentally demonstrated a technologically feasible attack,
where Eve can get full information and only introduces a QBER of 19.7%. A simple
“intercept-and-resend” attack will normally cause a QBER of 25% in BB84. So, our re-
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sult shows clearly an imperfection in the QKD implementation. The security of a single
photon BB84 QKD system has been compromised. Specially, this is the first successful
“intercept-and-resend” attack on top of a commercial bidirectional QKD system. The suc-
cess of our attack highlights not only the importance for Alice to verify that she is encoding
the right state during the encoding process, but also, more generally, the importance of
verification of the correctness of each step of an implementation of a QKD protocol in a
practical QKD system.
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